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Trust or verification? Accepting vulnerability in the making of the INF Treaty 
Nicholas J Wheeler, Joshua Baker, and Laura Considine,1 
 
In December 1987, US President Ronald Reagan and his Soviet counterpart General Secretary 
Mikhail Gorbachev met in Washington to sign a treaty abolishing an entire class of nuclear 
weapons. In the press conference before its signing, Reagan declared that the treaty reflected the 
ZLVGRP LQ WKH ROG 5XVVLDQ SURYHUE µDovorey no provorey - WUXVW EXW YHULI\¶ With regard to the 
YHULILFDWLRQ SURYLVLRQV RI WKH WUHDW\ WKH 86 SUHVLGHQW FODLPHG WKDW µ>W@KLV DJUHHPHQW FRQWDLQV WKH
most stringent verification regime in history, including provisions for inspection teams actually 
residing in each other's territory and several other IRUPV RI RQVLWH LQVSHFWLRQ¶2 The implication of 
5HDJDQ¶V VWDWHPHQW ZDV WKDW WKH signing and eventual implementation of the INF treaty became 
possible between two distrusting adversaries because it combined both trust and the promise of 
intrusive verification, and without either of these elements, there would have been no treaty. It also 
made clear that Reagan viewed trust and verification as distinct, but complementary concepts. But 
these propositions raise the question is OHIW XQDQVZHUHG LQ 5HDJDQ¶V VWDWHPHQW DQG LQGHHG LQ WKH
Russian proverb) as to the causal relationship between trust and verification. Put differently, is trust 
a requisite for the agreement and implementation of verification regimes, or is verification merely a 
surrogate for the lack of trust?  
 
To answer this question, the chapter sets up two competing approaches for conceiving the 
causal relationship between trust and verification, both RI ZKLFK FKDOOHQJH 5HDJDQ¶V QRWLRQ WKDW
trust and verification are distinct, but complementary ideas. The first approach does this by 
conceiving of the relationship between trust and verification as an inverse one; the greater the level 
of verification that is sought, the lower the level of trust between two antagonistic states. In the case 
of the INF Treaty, this approach would hold that the intrusive verification mechanisms were 
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themselves indicators of the lack of trust between the United States and the Soviet Union. 
Consequently, the argument goes, it is a misnomer to think LQ WHUPV RI µWUXVW EXW YHULI\¶ because 
verification is itself a substitute for trust. In such a scenario, a verification regime would have to be 
established because the parties have no trust in each other. This logic has recently been at play in 
US-Iran interactions, where the Obama administration has sought to sell the 2015 Iran nuclear deal 
by stating that it is based on verification and not trust3. Obama administration officials have 
repeatedly demonstrated an example of WKH µVXUURJDWH¶ DUJXPHQW E\ VWDWLQJ WKDW DQ LQWUXVLYH
foolproof verification arrangement is needed because the US government cannot rely on trust in 
VHFXULQJ ,UDQ¶V FRPSOLDQce with the terms of the deal.4 
 
The second approach to understanding the relationship between trust and verification 
considers that states will only agree to intrusive methods of verification if they have expectations as 
to thH RWKHU SDUW\¶V trustworthiness. Verification is therefore not a surrogate for trust, but is in fact 
highly reliant on the pre-existence of trust. This is because implementing intrusive verification 
regimes, such as the INF Treaty, makes leaders vulnerable in a multiplicity of ways, and we argue 
that this willingness to accept vulnerability is a key indicator that one party believes the other is 
potentially trustworthy. Trust and verification are not, therefore, as Reagan contended, distinct but 
complementary concepts. Instead, they exist in a symbiotic relationship where each is dependent on 
the other if arms control agreements are to be successful. It is our argument that it is this latter 
approach that best explains how the INF Treaty both became possible and we make good on this 
FODLP E\ VKRZLQJ KRZ 6RYLHW SHUFHSWLRQV DQG FUXFLDOO\ *RUEDFKHY¶V changed as to US (and 
FUXFLDOO\ 5HDJDQ¶V WUXVWZRUWKLQHVV The chapter shows how this approach to the INF Treaty reveals 
WKH OLPLWDWLRQV RI WKH µWUXVW EXW YHULI\¶ IRUPXODWLRQ EHFause *RUEDFKHY¶V decision to enter into new 
and highly stringent verification arrangements was dependent on this expectation of the US OHDGHU¶V
trustworthiness. 
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Trust and verification during the Cold War 
The dominant US approach to verification during the Cold War resembled the first of the two 
approaches we outlined above. The US government assumed that verification was an essential 
component of arms control treaties because the Soviet Union could not be trusted to honor its 
agreements. The assumption was that when Moscow signed a treaty its leaders did so in the firm 
knowledge they would cheat on it, or secondly, even if the current intentions of Soviet leaders were 
to comply, this could change in the future.5 To prevent either of these outcomes, the US government 
demanded highly intrusive forms of verification. 
 
7KH SXUSRVH RI YHULILFDWLRQ LV WR PRQLWRU D SDUW\¶V FRmpliance with an agreement/treaty. 
Monitoring is crucial to verification because it is the process by which information is obtained to 
make assessments about whether others are complying or not. In the field of nuclear arms control 
and disarmament, the detection of non-compliance must be timely enough so that the other party or 
parties can either individually or collectively respond to militarily significant violations. What is 
deemed a militarily significant violation cannot be determined in the abstract, and it will depend 
upon the perceptions of decision-makers as to the risks and costs of any future break-out. Policy-
makers have to decide whether cheating has taken place, and if so, whether this has exposed their 
state to a significantly increased risk of attack. 
 
The issue of whether the Soviet Union had cheated on arms control agreements with the 
United States became highly politicised in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The Reagan 
administration charged Moscow in the early and mid-1980s with violating the 1972 Interim 
Agreement on Strategic Arms (SALT 1) and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM), both signed 
in 1972. ,W ZDV DQ DUWLFOH RI IDLWK DPRQJ WKH µLGHRORJLFDO IXQGDPHQWDOLVWV¶6 driving US policy in the 
early 1980s that even if there was no direct evidence of Soviet cheating, it should be assumed that 
given the Marxist-/HQLQLVW FKDUDFWHU RI WKH 6RYLHW VWDWH 0RVFRZ¶V DSSDUHQW FRPSOLDnce hid the real 
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cheating that was taking place.7 As such, even a pattern of Soviet compliance was interpreted by the 
first Reagan administration as Moscow mimicking signals of trustworthiness to disguise its treaty 
violations. $V $OODQ .UDVV ZURWH LQ  µ>X@QGHU WKHVH DVVXPSWLRQV LW LV RI FRXUVH LPSRVVLEOH WR
imagine verification leading to a growth of trust. It will in fact lead only to demands for even more 
YHULILFDWLRQ DQGHYHQJUHDWHU GLVWUXVW¶8 
 
On the surface, the Soviet Union appears to have adopted a very different view to the United 
States on the question of the relationship between trust and verification. Rather than see verification 
as a surrogate for trust, Soviet negotiators have argued, in the words of Viktor Israelyan (when 
speaking to the Geneva based Committee on Disarmament in 1981), WKDW LW µVKRXOG QRW EH EXLOW
upon the principle of total distrust by states of one another and should not take the form of global 
VXVSLFLRXVQHVV¶9 Instead, as Roland Timerbaev (then a senior official in the Soviet foreign 
PLQLVWU\ FRQWHQGHG LQ KLV  ERRN RQ YHULILFDWLRQ WKH 6RYLHW YLHZ ZDV WKDW µ>D@JUHHPHQWV IRU
restraining the arms race must be based on a certain degree of mutual trust among the parties to the 
DJUHHPHQWV¶10 This chapter provides support for this view given our core contention that the INF 
Treaty became possible because of the trust that was built between the two sides prior to the signing 
of the Treaty. The problem with US and Soviet thinking in the early 1980s was that both 
superpowers believed that the other had shown by its actions that it could not be trusted, and as a 
result, each believed the other would necessarily cheat on any arms control agreement. It was this 
deadlock in superpower relations that Gorbachev was to break, and he did so by developing a belief 
in the trustworthiness of his US counterpart that opened the door to new conciliatory actions, 
including the signing of the INF Treaty. Before turning to this story of changing perceptions of US 
and Soviet trustworthiness, it is necessary to provide the conceptual scaffolding that supports our 
empirics. 
 
Trust, trustworthiness, and vulnerability 
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In emerging trusting relationships, our key litmus test of whether actors believe that another actor 
can be trusted, and the extent of that trust, is their willingness to accept new vulnerabilities and/or to 
live with existing ones. Aaron Hoffman similarly GHILQHG WUXVW DV µDQ DWWLWXGH LQYROYLQJ D
ZLOOLQJQHVV WR SODFH WKH IDWH RI RQH¶V LQWHUHVWV XQGHU WKH FRQWURO RI RWKHUV LQ D SDrticular context. 
This willingness is based on the belief, for which there is some uncertainty, that potential trustees 
will protect the interests placed in their control, even if they must sacrifice some of their own 
interests in doing so.¶11 In this definition, Hoffman applied to International Relations the standard 
cross-disciplinary definition of trust which is summed up in Denise Rousseau and her co-
UHVHDUFKHUV GHILQLWLRQ WUXVW LV µD SV\FKRORJLFDO VWDWH FRPSULVLQJ WKH LQWHQWLRQ WR DFFHSW YXOQHUDELOLW\
based upon positive expectations of the intentions or behavior of another.¶12 But Hoffman wanted to 
go beyond this psychological approach to trust, and argue that what is important is whether actors 
act on this trust, not simply the intention to do so as in 5RXVVHDX HW DO¶V GHILQLtion.13 The key action 
that begins a trust-building process is the acceptance of vulnerability on the part of one or both 
parties. 
 
Our approach here can be located within the cross-disciplinary literature in trust research 
that puts vulnerability at the heart of understanding and analyzing processes of trust-building. The 
paradox of vulnerability as a property of trust is that actors only take on the risks of making 
themselves vulnerable because they do not expect to be exploited. As the moral philosopher 
Annette Baier expressed it: µWUXVW is acceptance of vulnerability to harm that others could inflict, but 
which we judge that they will not in fact inflict.¶14 Given the importance of vulnerability to our 
conceptualization of trust, it is necessary to make two important clarifications. The first is that an 
actor¶V DFFHSWDQFH RI YXOQHUDELOLW\ EHFDXVH WKH\ µMXGJH¶ WKDW WKH RWKHU Zill not harm them, does not 
mean that their judgement is necessarily correct. The existential reality might differ fundamentally 
from the subjective perception of the actors themselves. As the trust researcher Barbara Misztal has 
SXW LW µWDONLQJ DERXW YXOnerability means taking into account subjective perception of a given 
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situation, not only referring to objective or external risks.¶15 In short, there is no objective measure 
of vulnerability against which to judge the behavior of the actors concerned. 
 
This leads into the second point which is that actors take on vulnerability in at least two 
different dimensions when they trust. The first relates to what Wheeler calls trust as authenticity, 
which refers to the idea that the party trusting (the trustor) - and thereby taking on vulnerability - 
believes that the other party (the trustee) does not have malevolent intentions towards them or their 
state.16 The second is what Wheeler calls trust as capacity which he defines as the belief on the part 
of the trusting agent that the trustee can be relied upon to deliver on any promises and commitments 
that they enter into.17 Even if one actor believes in the authenticity of another, there could be 
uncertainty as to how far a trusted counterpart can deliver on their promises, given the tumultuous 
nature of domestic politics. Vulnerability, then, can be experienced in a number of different ways, 
and on a number of different levels in an emerging trusting relationship.  
 
 Our argument here challenges the proposition of Vincent Keating and Jan Ruzicka, two 
prominent trust researchers in International Relations, who have argued that trust and vulnerability 
are incompatible. They have argued that, µ$FWRUV in a trusting relationship will have little to no 
feeling of vulnerability precisely because trust functions to cognitively reduce or eliminate their 
perception of ULVN LQ WKH VLWXDWLRQ¶18 For them, the acceptance of vulnerability is not an indicator of 
trust because µWKH H[LVWHQFH RI D WUXVWLQJ UHODWLRQVKLS PHDQV WKDW YXOQHUDELOLW\ LV QRW NQRZLQJO\
experienced by the actor.¶19 While we accept that in established trusting relationships, such as that 
between the United Kingdom and the United States, actors may not always experience vulnerability 
consciously, their formulation fails to capture a situation where actors knowingly experience 
vulnerability, but are not troubled in doing so because they trust.20 Indeed, by writing vulnerability 
out of the story, KeDWLQJ DQG5X]LFNDQHJOHFW WR VHH WKDW µWKH DFW RI WUXVW QHHGV WREH VHHQ DV RIIHULQJ
ERWK D VROXWLRQ WR WKH SUREOHP RI RXU YXOQHUDELOLW\ DQG DV H[SRVLQJ XV WR PRUH ULVNV¶21 We 
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recognize that in highly embedded trusting relationships,22 it is possible that habits and practices of 
trust can develop that does not rest on specific personal relationships of trust. However, in emerging 
trusting relationships such as between the US and Soviet leaderships in the mid to late 1980s, the 
development of trust can be so intrinsically tied to the interpersonal level that subjective feelings of 
vulnerability ± both in terms of authenticity and capacity ± may play a far greater role. We go on to 
demonstrate this by arguing that Gorbachev, on the basis of increasingly positive expectations about 
5HJDQ¶V PRWLYHV DQG LQWHQWLRQV WRRN VSHFLILF DFWLRQV DLPHG DW VLJQDOLQJ WKH 6RYLHW 8QLRQ¶V
trustworthiness that entailed accepting some degree of vulnerability. 
 
*RUEDFKHY¶V changing perceptions of US trustworthiness 
When QHJRWLDWLRQV RYHU UHGXFLQJHOLPLQDWLQJ WKH VXSHUSRZHUV¶ ,1) IRUFHV EHJDQ LQ  WKHUH
were few expectations of a breakthrough given the deep enmity between the two sides. After NATO 
followed through on its decision in 1979 to deploy US Cruise Missiles to US bases in the United 
Kingdom and the Netherlands, and the US Pershing II to US bases in the Federal Republic of 
Germany, the Soviet Union responded by walking out of all arms control negotiations. While 
Moscow eventually returned to the negotiating table in March 1985, both sides continued to treat 
the negotiations as a continuation of their seemingly enduring competition. Yet just two years later, 
the frozen hostility of the Cold War was melting away in a manner that would have been previously 
unthinkable, and a key moment in this process was the signing in December 1987 of the INF 
Treaty. It is our contention that a necessary (but not sufficient) condition of the INF Treaty was 
*RUEDFKHY¶V changed SHUFHSWLRQ RI 5HDJDQ¶V WUXVWZRUWKLQHVV DQG WKDW FUXFLDO to this transformation 
was the personal trust that developed between Reagan and Gorbachev, as well as among the key 
advisors of the two leaders.  
 
Reagan was initially hesitant about the possibility that Gorbachev would significantly 
change Soviet security and defence policy. As noted earlier, the first Reagan administration 
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believed that the Soviet Union had persistently exploited previous arms control agreements. In an 
internal memorandum, the US president noted that he anticipated no change in the underlying 
behaviour of the new Soviet leader, ZKR KH VDZ DV µWRWDOO\ GHGLFDWHG WR WUDGLWLRQDO 6RYLHW JRDOV¶23 
Similarly, there was little optimism on the Soviet side about a thaw in relations. Pavel Palazchenko, 
the long serving interpreter to Gorbachev and Soviet foreign minister, Eduard Shevardnadze, 
depicted WKH DWPRVSKHUH DW WKH WLPH DV µTXLWH SHVVLPLVWLF DERXW WKH SURVSHFWV RI 86-Soviet 
UHODWLRQV DW OHDVW ZKLOH 5RQDOG 5HDJDQ ZDV LQ RIILFH¶24 The prevailing mood was therefore not 
conducive to a departure IURP WKHµFRQIURQWDWLRQDO SROLFLHV¶ RIWKHSDVW25 
 
However, the traditional practice of US-6RYLHW HQHP\ LPDJLQJ FRQIOLFWHG ZLWK *RUEDFKHY¶V
own conviction that the superpowers were caught in a spiral of fear and mistrust that was feeding an 
ever-escalating armaments competition. The Soviet leader was strongly influenced by a group of 
key advisors within his inner circle that included Alexander Yaklov, Anatoly Chernyaev, and 
Shevardnadze (who replaced Andrei Gromyko as foreign minister in 1985). These so-FDOOHG µQHZ
WKLQNHUV¶ SUHVVHG XSRQ KLP WKH SURSRVLWLRQ WKDW WKH RQO\ VHFXULW\ LQ WKH QXFOHDU DJH ZDV PXWXDO RU
ZKDW WKH  3DOPH &RPPLVVLRQ KDG FDOOHG µFRPPRQ VHFXULW\¶ ± the notion that security should 
be achieved in common or not at all. Gorbachev gave official expression to these ideas in February 
1986 in a speech to the 27th Party Congress. In this speech he outlined the necessity for a 
demilitarisation of the US-Soviet relationship and the normalisation of Soviet relations with the rest 
oI WKH ZRUOG VWDWLQJ WKDW µ>H@TXDO VHFXULW\ LV WKH LPSHUDWLYH RI WKH WLPHV (QVXULQJ WKLV VHFXULW\ LV
becoming increasingly a political issue, one that can be resolved only by political means. It is high 
time to replace weapons by a more stable foundation IRUWKH UHODWLRQV DPRQJ VWDWHV¶26   
 
The new Soviet thinking on security showed an awareness of how both superpowers might 
EH HQVQDUHG LQ ZKDW KDV EHHQ WHUPHG µVHFXULW\ GLOHPPD G\QDPLFV¶ KRVWLOLW\ GULYHQ E\ PXWXDO IHDU
and not predatory ambition.27 Gorbachev and his key advisors appreciated that even though the 
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Soviet Union might profess defensive motives and intent, its enemies were not so easily reassured 
in the face of Soviet conventional capabilities which were configured for offensive operations 
against NATO forces. *RUEDFKHY UHMHFWHG WKH µLGHRORJLFDO IXQGDPHQWDOLVP¶ WKDW GHSLFWHG WKH
United States and its allies as inherently aggressive by virtue of their capitalist values and interests, 
and acknowledged that Soviet actions had created legitimate Western fears as to whether the Soviet 
Union had malign intent. Consequently, Gorbachev began developing new policies of common 
security that were designed to reassure the United States and NATO about the peaceful/defensive 
motives and intentions of the Soviet Union. $Q H[DPSOH RI WKLV FDQ EH VHHQ LQ *RUEDFKHY¶V
GLVFXVVLRQV EHIRUH WKH 5H\NMDYLN PHHWLQJ ZKHUH KH VWDWHV WKDW µQRWKLQJ ZLOO FRPH RXW RI LW LI RXU
proposals lead to a weakening of US security. The Americans will never agree to it. Thus, the 
principle is as follows: increased security for all on the way toward equal reduction of armaments 
OHYHOV¶28 Here, the Soviet leader exercised what Ken Booth and :KHHOHU KDYH FDOOHG µVHFXULW\
GLOHPPD VHQVLELOLW\¶ 7KH\ GHILQHG WKLV DV µDQ DFWRU¶V LQWHQWLRQ DQG FDSDFity to perceive the motives 
behind, and to show responsiveness towards, the potential complexity of the military intentions of 
others. In particular, it refers to the ability to understand the role that fear might play in their 
attitudes and behaviour, incOXGLQJ FUXFLDOO\ WKH UROH WKDW RQH¶V RZQ DFWLRQV PD\ SOD\ LQ SURYRNLQJ
WKDW IHDU¶29 
 
It was one thing to cognitively frame the US-Soviet conflict as an example of security 
dilemma dynamics, but it was quite another to make this empathetic awareness the basis of new 
Soviet trust-building initiatives given the risk that such policies might be exploited by the US 
government. What appears to have been crucial in leading Gorbachev to act on this empathy and 
accept a new measure of vulnerability was the trust he placed in Reagan. The initial step on this 
journey was his first summit meeting with Reagan in Geneva in November 1985. Those involved 
later stressed how important the meeting had been in encouraging the two leaders to believe they 
could work with each other.30 *RUEDFKHY KLPVHOI UHFDOOHG WKDW µRXU GLDORJXH ZDV YHU\
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FRQVWUXFWLYH«DQG LQFUHDVLQJO\ IULHQGO\ WKH EHWWHU ZH JRW WR NQRZ HDFK RWKHU¶31 The most important 
RXWFRPH RI WKH VXPPLW ZDV WKDW HDFK SOHGJHG WKDW QHLWKHU VLGH ZRXOG µVHHN PLOLWDU\ VXSHULRULW\¶32 
This was a decisive rejection of the nuclear war-fighting policies that had characterised the first 
Reagan Administration, and an acknowledgment of the reality that the only security in the nuclear 
age was common security.  
 
The now declassified WUDQVFULSWV RI WKH *HQHYD PHHWLQJ UHYHDO 5HDJDQ DQG *RUEDFKHY¶V
awareness of the role that trust could play in improving US-Soviet relations. Both leaders spoke of 
the importance of increasing political dialogue at all levels and expanding opportunities for trade as 
a means of achieving increased trust.33 In an excerpt from the diary of Anatoly Chernyaev, Deputy 
Head of the International Department of the CPSU, written just after the Geneva summit, he 
REVHUYHG WKDW µ>6@RPHWKLQJ FDUGLQDO KDV RFFXUUHG WKH DUPs race is going on, nothing has changed in 
WKH PLOLWDU\ FRQIURQWDWLRQ EXW D WXUQLQJ SRLQW LV QRWLFHDEOH LQ LQWHUQDWLRQDO UHODWLRQV¶34 While it 
would be naive to think that one summit meeting could reverse decades of suspicion and animosity, 
the meeting went some way to convincing Gorbachev that he could work with Reagan. Moreover, it 
seems that Gorbachev increasingly appreciated that if trust were to be built between the leaders of 
the United States and the Soviet Union, this would require more than declarations of good 
intentions. What was needed beyond such declarations were concrete actions which could begin to 
EUHDNGRZQWKH µEDUULHU RIPLVWUXVW¶35 
 
*RUEDFKHY¶V ILUVW DWWHPSW WR OHW KLV DFWLRQV VSHDN ORXGHU WKDQ KLV ZRUGV ZDV KLV SURSRVDO RQ
15 January 1986 for global nuclear disarmament by the year 2000.  However, he was disappointed 
E\ WKH 86 UHMHFWLRQ RI KLV GLVDUPDPHQW YLVLRQ DQG E\ ZKDW KH VDZ DV 5HDJDQ¶V FRQWLQXLQJ EHOOLFRVH
rhetoric.36 Chernyaev describes a feeling at the time among Gorbachev and his closest advisors that 
WKH µKDQG >*RUEDFKHY@ H[WHQGHG ZDV OHIW VXVSHQGHG LQ PLG-DLU¶37 The Chernobyl disaster three 
months ODWHU UHLQIRUFHG *RUEDFKHY¶V GHYHORSLQJ EHOLHI WKDW LQ <HYJHQ\ 9HOLNKRY¶V ZRUGV µD JUHDW
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LQVWLQFWLYH OHDS WR EUHDN WKH ROG F\FOH¶38 of mistrust, suspicion, and secrecy in East-West 
negotiations was required. *RUEDFKHY¶V ILUVW µOHDS¶ RFFXUUHG WKH IROORZLQJ PRQWK In the face of 
VWURQJ RSSRVLWLRQ IURP µWKH *HQHUDO 6WDII WKH 0LQLVWU\ RI 'HIHQVH DQG WKH .*%¶39 he instructed 
his chief negotiator, Ambassador Grinevsky, at the deadlocked Stockholm Conference on 
Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe to accept unprecedented 
on-site inspections.40 This concession was highly significant, not only because it made possible the 
signing of a new treaty that increased military transparency on both sides, but also because it held 
out the promise that Moscow might be prepared to accept an equally demanding standard of 
verification in the nuclear arena.  
 
Whether *RUEDFKHY¶V willingness to accept on-site inspections in Stockholm would have 
still occurred in the absence of his first face-to-face encounter with Reagan in Geneva the previous 
November is a fascinating counter-factual. As noted above, Gorbachev was disappointed with the 
US response to his January 1986 disarmament proposal and he was looking for more evidence that 
Reagan could be a partner in the task of ending the nuclear arms race. The Soviet leader was eager 
to meet Reagan again and proposed a meeting in Reykjavik.41   
 
The two leaders came tantalisingly close to agreeing on the abolition of all nuclear weapons 
during their two days of negotiations in Iceland. But what stood in the way of the two leaders 
UHDFKLQJ VXFK D PRPHQWRXV DJUHHPHQW ZDV 5HDJDQ¶V LQVLVWHQFH that nuclear disarmament proceed 
in tandem with the development and testing of the proposed US missile defence shield (the 
Strategic Defence Initiative [SDI]). Reagan had announced his dream of protecting the US public 
from Soviet nuclear missiles in March 1983 and the president remained fervently committed to the 
development of SDI at Reykjavik. Despite the failure of Reagan and Gorbachev to reach an 
agreement, the meeting was a crucial moment in the building of trust between the two leaders. 
Gorbachev reflected in 1992 to George Shultz that Reykjavik was the turning point in bringing 
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about the end of the Cold War.42 This was confirmed by CKHUQ\DHYZKR FRQVLGHUHG WKDW µ>D@ spark 
of understanding was born between them, as if they had winked to each other aERXW WKH IXWXUH¶43 
Such sentiments were shared by Reagan who wrote in his Memoir that µ>O@ooking bDFN QRZ LW¶V
clear there was a chemistry between Gorbachev and me that produced something very close to a 
IULHQGVKLS¶44  
 
Gorbachev was disappointed with ReaJDQ¶V VXEVHTXHQW UHVSRQVH WR KLV IDU-reaching arms 
reduction proposals at Reykjavik.45 However, he made a crucial distinction after the summit 
EHWZHHQ 5HDJDQ DQG KLV LQQHU FLUFOH¶V PRWLYHV DQG LQWHQWLRQV ZKLFK KH VDZ DV SHDFHIXOGHIHQVLYH
and the position of the hawks in Washington who he considered had not given up the quest for 
nuclear superiority. For the hawks, Gorbachev reasoned, SDI could not be traded away because it 
was a critical component in their bid for a first-strike strategy. According to Anatoly Dobrynin, the 
veteran Soviet Ambassador to the United States, Gorbachev told him after he returned from 
5H\NMDYLN WKDW µKH FRXOG ZRUN ZLWK 5HDJDQ¶ DQG WKDW KH µVDZ LQ KLP D SHUVRQ FDSDEOH RI WDNLQJ
JUHDW GHFLVLRQV¶46 This view is supported by Chernyaev ZKR FODLPHG WKDW µ$IWHU 5H\NMDYLN KH
>*RUEDFKHY@ QHYHU DJDLQ VSRNH DERXW 5HDJDQ LQ KLV LQQHU FLUFOH DV KH KDG EHIRUH¶47 Gorbachev 
began to think that in Reagan he had a partner who he could work with in leading the world away 
from the abyss of nuclear destruction. 5DWKHU WKDQ YLHZLQJ 5HDJDQ DV D UHSUHVHQWDWLYH RI µ86
LPSHULDOLVP¶ *RUEDFKHY LQ Andrei *UDFKHY¶V ZRUGV EHJDQ WR YLHZ KLP µDV D WUXVWZRUWK\ SDUWQHU
ZKR VKDUHG VLPLODU KRSHV DQG LGHDV¶48 Gorbachev began after Reykjavik to put this conviction to 
the test, and in doing so showed his willingness to accept an increased level of vulnerability for 
both himself and the Soviet Union.  
 
*RUEDFKHY¶V YXOQHUDELOLW\ in the making of the INF Treaty 
Gorbachev was anxious to turn the positive atmospherics that had developed between him and 
Reagan in Iceland into concrete agreements that limited the US-Soviet nuclear competition. To this 
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end, the Soviet leader took some key decisions during 1987 that only became possible because 
Gorbachev had come to believe that he could trust Reagan and his inner circle. As we noted at the 
beginning of the chapter, it is in the nature of trust that actors only accept vulnerability when they 
have strong expectations that their trust will not be exploited. There is, however, always a degree of 
uncertainty in this regard. The unilateral trust-building steps taken by Gorbachev in 1987 indicate 
that he judged that his trust would not be exploited, yet he still made himself vulnerable in a number 
of interrelated ways. 
 
 The first major conciliatory move came in February 1987 when Gorbachev proposed 
delinking INF from SDI.49 He confirmed this proposition at a meeting in April 1987 in Moscow 
with Shultz.50 Gorbachev, writing in his Memoir LQ  GHVFULEHG WKLV PHHWLQJ DV D µPLOHVWRQH¶51 
+H UHIOHFWHG WKDW KH KDG JDLQHG WKH LPSUHVVLRQ VWUHQJWKHQHG E\ 6KXOW]¶V VXEVHTXHQW DFWLRQV WKDW
here was a US policy-PDNHU ZKR µJHQXLQHO\ ZDQWHG WR VXVWDLQ WKH GLDORJXH¶ and who was prepared 
WR ZRUN WR WUDQVIRUP µRXU DJUHHPHQW LQ SULQFLSOH LQWR SURGXFWLYH cooperation¶52 Interestingly, 
however, the accounts of this meeting at the time tell a different story. In his report to the Politburo, 
Gorbachev expressed his disappointment with Shultz not reciprocating Soviet concessions and 
failing to bring DQ\WKLQJ QHZ WR WKH WDEOH +H H[SODLQHG WKLV DW WKH WLPH DV 6KXOW] EHLQJ µWRR FORVHO\
connected to the military-industrial complex.¶53 From the memorandum of their conversation it 
appears that Gorbachev felt let down by what Shultz brought to this meeting following the de-
linking move. Nevertheless, another major concession came in June 1987 when the Soviet Union 
finally agreed to on-site inspections (OSI) of INF missile manufacturing and storage sites. And the 
third occurred the following month when *RUEDFKHY SURSRVHG WKH JOREDO µGRXEOH-]HUR¶ RSWLRQ WKDW
authorised the removal all INF and Short-Range Intermediate Nuclear Forces (SRINF) systems 
from both Europe and Asia.54 These three concessions removed the obstacles towards the signing of 
the INF Treaty, which Gorbachev claimed in his Memoir UHSUHVHQWHG µWKH ILUVW ZHOO-prepared step 
RQRXUZD\RXWRI WKH&ROG:DU¶55  
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 Theses moves that were so crucial in leading to the INF Treaty made Gorbachev 
increasingly vulnerable on a number of grounds. Even if Gorbachev had faith in the authenticity of 
Reagan and Shultz, and believed that they would not willingly and knowingly exploit his trusting 
moves, it was less clear to Gorbachev that they had the capacity to follow through upon what they 
had agreed. Reagan was increasingly beleaguered in domestic battles at home, with the Republicans 
having lost control of the US Senate in the November Congressional elections, and the presidency 
increasingly mired in the Iran-Contra scandal. Consequently, Gorbachev knew that there was a risk 
that the US president, with less than two years left in office, might not ± even if he wanted to - have 
the capacity to deliver an agreement on strategic nuclear arms.56 This in turn made Gorbachev 
politically vulnerable in the Soviet Union. If the INF Treaty negotiations ultimately failed, and 
Gorbachev had nothing to show for making these dramatic concessions, he would be exposed to 
those hardliners who continued to believe in the malign intent of the US government. Gorbachev 
was therefore becoming increasingly worried that Reagan was losing ground to the hardliners in his 
own DGPLQLVWUDWLRQ *RUEDFKHY¶V LQFUHDVLQg uneasiness in this regard was made clear in the 
aforementioned April 1987 meeting, where he lamented the lack of US reciprocation of his de-
linking move by stating WKDW µWKH SRVLWLRQ RI WKH 86 DGPLQLVWUDWLRQ LV RQH RI YHU\ UHDO H[WRUWLRQ
from its partnHU LWLV DSRVLWLRQ RIWUHDWLQJ LWV SDUWQHU GLVUHVSHFWIXOO\¶57 
 
The proposition advanced in this chDSWHU WKDW *RUEDFKHY¶V WUXVW LQ 5HDJDQ played a pivotal 
role in making possible the INF Treaty runs up against the objection that Gorbachev had no choice 
but WR FRRSHUDWH JLYHQ WKH 6RYLHW 8QLRQ¶V GHVSHUDWH HFRQRPLF VLWXDWLRQ Given the weaknesses of 
the Soviet economy, it is argued by some that any Soviet leader at this time would have been 
compelled to make concessions in the way Gorbachev did.58 Such a position downplays the 
VLJQLILFDQFH ZH KDYH DWWDFKHG WR *RUEDFKHY¶V QHZ WKLQNLQJ DQG KLV H[HUFLVH RI VHFXULW\ GLOHPPD
sensibility in the transformation of US-Soviet relations. We agree that the material pressures 
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exerted by a declining economy were importaQW HQDEOLQJ FRQGLWLRQV RI *RUEDFKHY¶V DFWLRQV DQG LW
is difficult to imagine that he could have secured domestic support for his new thinking had the 
Soviet Union not been so materially weak. But what is crucial to our argument is that material 
factors were insufficient by themselves to explain the trust-building actions that Gorbachev took in 
1986-7.59 
 
The road of conciliation and cooperation was not the only one that the Soviet Union could 
KDYH WDNHQ DW WKLV WLPH DQG *RUEDFKHY¶V DFWLRQV ZHUH QRW DQ LQHYitable response to the material 
pressures that the Soviet Union faced. Such a view finds support from Chernyaev who asserted that 
WKH LQIOXHQFH RI GRPHVWLF HFRQRPLF SUHVVXUHV WKRXJK LPSRUWDQW µGRHV QRW GHILQLWLYHO\ FDSWXUH
*RUEDFKHY¶V PRWLYHV¶, which he argued also came from a number of elements that included his 
awareness of the potential devastation of nuclear war, his personal moral principles, and his belief 
that no one would attack the Soviet Union.60 There were indeed others at that time such as Victor 
Grishin and Grigory Romanov, the closest contenders with Gorbachev in 1985 for the post of 
Soviet leader, who would most likely have adopted a more competitive approach to the US-Soviet 
relationship.61 Robert English has maintained that the most likely outcome in the 1985 leadership 
competition in the Kremlin was a further continuation of East±West confrontation. The fact that a 
GLIIHUHQW FRXUVH ZDV FKRVHQ KH FRQFOXGHV µZDV WKDQNV WR WKH VLQJXODU LQIOXHQFH RI LGHDV DQG WKH
singular leadership of GorbacheY¶62 Richard Ned Lebow and George Breslauer use counterfactual 
methods to likewise argue that if Grishin had been elected it would be hard to imagine a similar 
process of de-escalation.63 
 
One striking aspect of the concessions that Gorbachev made in 1986-7 is that there was no 
equivalent reciprocation on the part of the US government. Yet Gorbachev persisted in making 
progressively more significant concessions, especially after Reykjavik, despite knowing that some 
Politburo conservatives advocated confronting the United States.64 Against these critics, the Soviet 
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leader insisted that to retreat from cooperation would strengthen the hands of the conservatives in 
the Reagan Administration, leading to an escalation of the arms competition which would increase 
the risks of war and place enormous strain on the Soviet economy. Although the Reagan 
$GPLQLVWUDWLRQ GLG QRW SRVLWLYHO\ UHFLSURFDWH *RUEDFKHY¶V PRYHV QRU GLG WKH\ GR DQ\WKLQJ WR
exploit them. .HQ %RRWK KDV PDGH DQ LPSRUWDQW GLVWLQFWLRQ EHWZHHQ µSRVLWLYH UHFLSURFDWLRQ¶ DQG
µQHJDWLYH UHFLSURFDWLRQ¶ Positive reciprocation refers to actions which are taken in direct response 
to a conciliatory move and which reward the initiating state with an equivalent concession. By 
contrast, negative reciprocation occurs if the state that is rewarded with the initial concession(s) 
GRHV QRW VHHN WR WDNH DGYDQWDJH RI WKH LQLWLDWLQJ VWDWH¶V PRYHV E\ WDNLQJ VWHSV ZKLFK PDNH LW OHVV
secure.65 
 
Abraham Sofaer, then the Legal Advisor to Secretary of State Shultz, reflected at a 
conference to mark the twentieth anniversary of Reykjavik that whilst not engaging in large±scale 
JHVWXUHV WKH 5HDJDQ DGPLQLVWUDWLRQ DGRSWHG WKUHH SULQFLSOHV RI DFWLRQ LQ UHVSRQVH WR *RUEDFKHY¶V
concessions. 7KHVH ZHUH µUHJLPH DFFHSWDQFH¶ WKH DGPLQLVWUDWLRQ would not try to overthrow or 
XQGHUPLQH WKH OHJLWLPDF\ RI WKH 6RYLHW V\VWHP µOLPLWHG OLQNDJH¶ WKH 86 JRYHUQPHQW would 
continue negotiations on arms control issues, despite differences in other areas such as human rights 
RU HVSLRQDJH DQG µUKHWRULFDO UHVWUDLQW¶ SURPLVLQJ QRW WR SXEOLFO\ µFURZ¶ RYHU DQ\ IDYRUDEOH 6RYLHW
actions).66 7KH 5HDJDQ DGPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶V SULQFLSOH RI QRW FURZLQJ RYHU 6RYLHW FRQFHVVLRQV ZDV DOVR
practiced in the human rights arena as explored by Sarah Snyder in her chapter in this volume. US 
QHJDWLYH UHFLSURFDWLRQ RI WKLV NLQG ZDV VXIILFLHQW WR UHLQIRUFH *RUEDFKHY¶V FRQILGHQFH WKDW IXWXUH
conciliatory moves would not be exploited by the Reagan administration. Writing in 2006, Sofaer 
FRQVLGHUHG WKDW µ>W@KH LQFUHDVHG WUXVW WKDW *RUEDFKHY DQG«6KHYDUGQDG]H GHYHORSHG IRU 5HDJDQ
and Shultz was based...on confidence that no effort would be made to challenge the legal legitimacy 
of the Soviet regime, that both sides would avoid linking their many differences, and that Soviet 
leaders would not be publicly embarrassed when they took actions favouUHG E\WKH8QLWHG 6WDWHV¶67 
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2XU FODLP WKDW *RUEDFKHY¶V WUXVW LQ 5HDJDQ ZDV SLYRWDO WR WKH PDNLQJ RI WKH ,1) 7UHDW\
depends on the proposition that the Soviet leader chose to accept a new level of vulnerability as a 
FRQVHTXHQFH RI KLV GHYHORSLQJ EHOLHI LQ 5HDJDQ¶V WUXVWZRUWKLQHVV We have shown that he accepted 
a certain level of vulnerability in terms of capacity; the risk being that a politically weakened 
Reagan would not prove capable of delivering on his promises. However, there is also evidence that 
the SoYLHW 8QLRQ¶V FRQFHVVLRQV DOVR entailed a certain level of vulnerability in terms of authenticity. 
7KH DUJXPHQW KDV EHHQ PDGH E\ D QXPEHU RI VFKRODUV WKDW WKH 6RYLHW 8QLRQ¶V FRQFHVVLRQV ZHUH
maWHULDOO\ PHDQLQJOHVV EHFDXVH WKHLU QXFOHDU ZHDSRQV FDSDELOLWLHV JDYH WKHP D µPDUJLQ RI VDIHW\¶
that allowed them to make these moves without decreasing their security.68 What these arguments 
miss, however, is that what counts as an acceptable level of vulnerability is not fixed and should not 
be judged in the abstract.69 It is, instead, the subject of political contestation and bureaucratic 
battles, and is decided upon subjectively by the actors themselves. What an acceptable level of 
vulnerability is for one actor may be very different to another. This is important to recognise as, 
despite WKH µVDIHW\ EODQNHW¶ FRQWHQWLRQ *RUEDFKHY¶V XQLODWHUDO FRQFLOLDWRUy moves were perceived 
by some within the Soviet leadership, especially the military, as increasing the vulnerability of the 
Soviet state to potential US exploitation. As we noted earlier, the move to agree to on-site 
inspections at the Stockholm conference IRU LQVWDQFH ZDV VWURQJO\ RSSRVHG E\ µWKH *HQHUDO 6WDII
the Ministry of Defence, and the KGB.¶70 According to $PEDVVDGRU¶V Lynn Hansen and Oleg 
Grinevsky, who the representatives at the Stockholm conference of the United States and the Soviet 
Union, respectively, the emotions had run high over this issue within the Soviet leadership, and 
during the Politburo meetings on the topic Marshal Akhromeyev Chief of the General Staff and 
advisor to Gorbachev, repeatedly accused Grinevsky, who was in favour of the measure, as being 
JXLOW\ RI µVWDWH WUHDVRQ¶71 7KH SRLQW KHUH LV WKDW *RUEDFKHY¶V XQLODWHUDO FRQFHVVLRQV were not made 
through a feeling of invulnerability, but rather through a belief he could trust in 5HDJDQ¶V
authenticity not to exploit WKH6RYLHW8QLRQ¶V FRQFLOLDWRU\ PRYHV 
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Conclusion 
:LWKRXW *RUEDFKHY¶V GHFLVLRQ WR DSSO\ WKH SULQFLSOH RI RQ-site inspections to the issue of INF, there 
would have been no treaty in December 1987. We have argued that this constituted a trust-building 
action ± which we have crucially defined as one that entails an acceptance of vulnerability. Such an 
acceptance dependeG XSRQ *RUEDFKHY¶V EHOLHI What Reagan could be trusted not to exploit a 
conciliatory move of this kind. This confidence on the part of Gorbachev emerged out of the 
interpersonal dynamics that developed between Reagan and Gorbachev in the period 1985-87. 
Space has precluded a fuller discussion of how the face-to-face encounters between Reagan and 
Gorbachev and their officials built a climate of mutual trust.72 But it is our contention that without 
Gorbachev¶V FKDQJHG SHUFHSWLRQ RI 5HDJDQ¶V WUXVWZRUWKLQHVV WKe Soviet leader would not have 
been willing to accept the vulnerabilities ± both to himself and to a lesser degree the Soviet state ± 
which were entailed by making the concessions that made the INF Treaty possible. This new-found 
trust in Reagan not only led to the signing of the treaty between the two leaders on the White House 
lawn in 1987, but it also facilitated a successful verification regime that endured beyond their 
leaderships. 
 
2XU SURSRVLWLRQ WKDW *RUEDFKHY¶V DFFHSWDQFH RI VWULQJHQW YHULILFDWLRQ measures in INF was 
a trust-EXLOGLQJ DFWLRQ UHYHDOV WKH OLPLWDWLRQV RI 5HDJDQ¶V IUDPLQJ RI WKH ,1) 7UHDW\ LQ WHUPV RI
µWUXVW EXW YHULI\¶ In the case of INF, verification did not simply operate as complementary to trust; 
instead, the Soviet agreement to accept on-site inspections was dependent on prior changes in 
*RUEDFKHY¶V SHUFHSWLRQV RI 5HDJDQ¶V trustworthiness. 7KH SUREOHP ZLWK 5HDJDQ¶V XVH RI µWUXVW EXW
YHULI\¶ was that it appeared to present these two concepts as dichotomous. We have argued that 
such an understanding fails to recognise that, in some contexts, decisions to accept more intrusive 
forms of verification might themselves be acts which depend on a prior level of trust and which, in 
turn, contribute to increasing that trust.73 At the same time, we recognise that the developing trust 
 19 
 
between Reagan and Gorbachev was not sufficient to obviate the US or Soviet requirements of 
highly intrusive verification provisions. Even if Reagan and Gorbachev trusted LQ HDFK RWKHU¶
authenticity on the INF issue, they could not have carried, in the absence of these provisions, those 
within their governments who remained deeply suspicious RI WKHRWKHU OHDGHU¶V LQWHQWLRQV  
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